Copyright © 1980 by The New England Historic Genealogical Society
| + | Reported died in service | Clrk. | Clerk |
| * | Reported deserted | Trum. | Trumpeter |
| c | Reported captured | Chpl. | Chaplain |
| ds | Reported discharged | Intr. | Interpreter |
| Gen. | General | Gun. | Gunner |
| Col. | Colonel | Surg. | Surgeon |
| Maj. | Major | Qrm. | Quartermaster |
| Cap. | Captain | Trm. | Truckmaster |
| Lt. | Lieutenant | Corn. | Cornet |
| Ens. | Ensign | Armr. | Armourer |
| Sgt. | Sergeant | Plt. | Pilot |
| Corp. | Corporal | Mate | Mate |
| Pvt. | Private | Adj. | Adjuntant |
| Trp. | Trooper | Comm. | Commissary |
I
The Peace of Rhyswick, signed on 20 September 1697, brought the first of four major Anglo-French imperial conflicts to an inconclusive end. By the terms of the treaty, Louis XIV acknowledged William III to be the true king of England. The treaty also stipulated the return of all captured colonial territory and the appointment of commissioners to arbitrate the disputed boundaries of Hudson Bay, Maine and Acadia.
Anglo-French hostilities, however, did not cease for long. The years following the treaty were uneasy ones, marked by French aggressiveness in both Europe and America. In 1702, England and Holland declared war on France and Spain in order to prevent the crafty Louis XIV from gaining control of the Spanish crown and colonial possessions. The War of the Spanish Succession, known as Queen Anne's War in America, dragged on for eleven weary years. It concluded finally in 1713.1
In the North American colonies, Queen Anne's War was characterized by intermittent frontier raids by Indians and Europeans. Such bloody skirmishes led Cotton Mather to label the period the "Decennium luctuosum," the woeful decade. Historically, the frontier raids have tended to overshadow other important events in the northern colonial theater of Queen Anne's War. One American colonial scholar, for example, has termed Queen Anne's War a "spasmodic, half-hearted sort of war." Another calls it a "futile war which, with one single but important exception, produced nothing."2 In actuality, the four years between 1707 and 1711 saw constant rather than "spasmodic" warfare; six expeditions against Canada and Port Royal were attempted during this period. Moreover, despite the fact that all but one failed dismally, these expeditions are of some significance in American colonial history.
Queen Anne's Canadian expeditions were among the first efforts at large-scale military cooperation between Great Britain and her American colonies and among the northern colonies themselves.3 These campaigns established patterns in military operations which would reappear frequently in the long series of eighteenth-century colonial wars. The logistical problems, intercolonial rivalries, hesitant colonial cooperation and mistrust of the British which marked the Canadian expeditions foreshadowed later campaigns, including Cartagena and Louisbourg. More importantly, Britain's inadequate support for the expeditions suggested the need for greater coordination among the colonies. By 1711, when Queen Anne's last Canadian expedition ended in catastrophe, two trends important to the future of the American colonies had emerged. First, Great Britain had evinced an ominous disregard for American concerns and conditions. Second, a precedent for intercolonial cooperation, however imperfect, had been set. In a sense, the seeds which later blossomed into revolution were planted during Queen Anne's War.
The present volume encompasses the era of Queen Anne's War and the Canadian expeditions. It covers the period from 1702 to 1722, providing the names and service data for enlisted men and officers enrolled in the Massachusetts forces in those years.* This volume is the fifth in a biographical series published jointly by the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Archives Division, and by the New England Historic Genealogical Society. Generally, it follows, the format of its predecessors. An alphabetical listing of all soldiers enlisted in the twenty-year period immediately preceding the years included in Myron O. Stachiw's Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers, 1723 - 1743, Dummer's War to the War of Jenkins' Ear (Boston, 1979), is provided here.4
In this introductory essay, the usual practice in quoting from primary material has been to make minor changes in punctuation and form where that improves clarity. To aid readability and notetaking, spelling has been modernized. The wording of the original, however, has been preserved. Dates are given Old Style, with a double-year designation where that is supplied in the original.
Although the War of the Spanish Succession erupted in Europe in 1702, the northern English colonies remained largely undisturbed by conflict until 1703. In August of that year, a group of French and Indians pounced upon the Maine frontier town of Wells. This raid, part of a combined attack against the northern settlements front Wells to Casco, ignited the frontier. Scalpings and burnings along New England's borders continued sporadically for the next ten years. New York, which benefitted from a 1701 treaty of neutrality between the French and the Iroquois Five Nations, generally escaped this destruction.
The attack on Deerfield, Massachusetts, typifies the kind of frontier battle waged during Queen Anne's War. On the last day of February 1703/4, some two hundred fifty French and Abenakis Indians struck tiny Deerfield, the northwestern outpost of the Massachusetts frontier. When the raiders left the sacked town, approximately forty settlers lay dead. Over one hundred unhappy captives were forced to accompany the French and Indians on their retreat to Canada. Those too weak to last the onerous journey were dispatched (perhaps mercifully) by tomahawk. Years passed before the surviving Deerfield captives were repatriated.
Enraged by the Deerfield massacre, that doughty Indian fighter Major Benjamin Church gathered a number of New Englanders for a retaliatory raid. In the spring of 1704, Church led a sea expedition north along the Maine coast. His men ravaged a few fishing villages and burned the French town of Grand-Pré. Beyond venting New England's frustrations, the campaign accomplished little. Church's expedition returned to the Bay Colony without attacking Port Royal, the principal French settlement in Acadia (present-day Nova Scotia).
During the two years following the Church campaign, Canada and New England attempted to establish an unofficial neutrality. Northern frontier settlements enjoyed relative quiet as peace proposals were exchanged. Negotiations fell through in 1706, and in 1707 border raids resumed with all the old ferocity.5 Many New Englanders showed extraordinary fortitude in responding to the French and Indian attacks. The self-possessed Mrs. Bradley of Haverhill, for example, remained undaunted by the Indians. As one of the "fierce Tawnies" entered her door, Mrs. Bradley "took the opportunity to pour a good quantity of scalding soap (which was then boiling over the fire) upon him, whereby he was killed immediately." Despite such bravery, the raids spread panic along the frontier. By March 1707, the bounty on Indian scalps reached the unprecedented sum of £100. In May, the Massachusetts Assembly ordered an earlier "act to prevent the desertion of the frontiers of this province" continued. In June, the Boston Newsletter complained that "the Indians are skulking everywhere on our frontiers."6
Frontier events influenced the development of the Canadian expeditions in several important ways. Unrest along the frontiers exacerbated political tensions within the Bay Colony. Citizens unhappy with Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley's response to the French and Indian menace accused him of "private treacherous correspondence with Her Majesty's enemies." Such political opposition obviously made the organization of the Canadians expeditions more difficult. The border attacks also worsened relations between New England and New York. New Englanders forced to defend a long frontier bitterly resented New York's neutrality. The antipathy between these colonies complicated efforts to unify against the French enemy. Finally, the French and Indian attacks convinced the English colonists, particularly those in New England, that lasting peace could only be attained with the defeat of the French in Canada. To accomplish this, some form of intercolonial cooperation was necessary.7
II
Perhaps to forestall accusations of treason, Governor Dudley in early 1707 proposed a campaign to reduce Port Royal in Acadia. Port Royal was a likely choice. French vessels based there threatened New England's fishing, trade, and navigation. Indeed, French privateers from Port Royal so harried New England's ships that the settlement was designated the "Dunkirk of America." Acadia was also a known sanctuary for the hostile Abenakis Indians. In addition, Port Royal seemed a relatively easy prize. New Englanders under Sir William Phips captured Port Royal in 1690, returning the territory under the Treaty of Rhyswick.8 The 1707 Port Royal campaign, however, was destined to fail miserably. Of all the Canadian expeditions during Queen Anne's War, this enterprise reveals most clearly the intercolonial jealousies that posed continual obstacles to united action.
Dudley attempted to garner support for the Port Royal expedition from the New England colonies, but had little success. "I am of opinion that a thousand men, with two or three ships of strength, besides transports, may drive all their country into their fort, and in a short time starve them out," he wrote Connecticut Governor Fitz-John Winthrop. "I ... must expect a number of men from your government to join with the forces of those provinces... I believe Rhode Island will come in." Winthrop's reply and the subsequent correspondence between the two men offer insights into the political factions within the colonies. Like Dudley, Winthrop thought Port Royal "fit to be reduced." Winthrop, however, noted that self-interest dictated against support for the expedition:
Yet the temper of our people (though very stout) is generally very thoughtful and cautious, and 'tis possible some may insinuate that though we should succeed in the design, yet if upon the conclusion of a peace (which one would think not far off) it should be restored to them, the honor of our success will soon be forgotten, and we should much resent that we have lost our blood and treasure. And 'tis not unlikely but others will consider that at this time, when we are every day alarmed and expect considerable parties of the enemy from Canada to infest our frontiers, it may be hazardous to draw out of the country so many choice men.9
Such pragmatic concerns masked intercolonial resentments and political intrigues, real deterrents to cooperation. Winthrop, for example, informed Dudley that:
the General Assembly being dismissed last night, they have desired me to signify to your excellency that, considering their present circumstances, they are not able to assist in the design, and they think they should have been of council to consult and agree the methods of undertaking.
In response to a later plea for help, Winthrop petulantly wrote: "I am very sensible we are unhappy not to share in the honor of that great enterprise, but we can't help it."10 This unwillingness to assist in the Port Royal campaign may he connected to political conspiracies against Dudley. With the colonial agent Sir Henry Ashurst and Cotton Mather (who termed Dudley "that Ahab"), Winthrop's brother Walt schemed to overthrow Dudley. Possibly, the Connecticut governor hesitated to support an expedition which would have assured Dudley's political future had it succeeded.11Whatever reasons account for it, Connecticut's failure to join the expedition illustrates the reluctance of the English colonies to subordinate their individual grievances to a unified effort. This hesitation, particularly pronounced in 1707, remained a weakness in later Canadian expeditions. Indeed, it hindered concerted action throughout the colonial wars.12
Massachusetts was almost the only participant in the Port Royal campaign. The expedition under Colonel John March finally set sail on 13 May 1707; nearly all of the 1,000 troops aboard some two dozen sloops were Massachusetts men. Rhode Island and New Hampshire together sent a mere 140 men, while Connecticut provided none. Assistance from the mother country was limited to one ship, Her Majesty's frigate Deptford. The fleet arrived at Port Royal early in June. On 7 June, March disembarked bravely with his men. Chaos ensued, although the New England forces greatly outnumbered the French garrison under Governor Daniel Subercase.13
The disintegration of the Port Royal expedition exemplifies the disorganization, petty jealousies, and British-American animosity which marred later colonial campaigns. A Bostonian present at Port Royal sent a scathing description of the poor logistical planning to friends at home:
They landed 7 or 8 miles off in a safe way that killed and harrassed our men and made them be out all night on both sides of the river in the woods so that the whole country being alarmed, the next tide of ebb brought them all into the fort. Whereas our men might have landed within three miles of the fort safer than where they were and then would have certainly cut off the communication, and absolutely have prevented the inhabitants joining the fort and we might have had most of them and their goods, whereas now we have nothing.14
Deprived of booty, the enlisted men rebelled. Their officers were too busy squabbling over tactics to quell discontent. Hostility between Americans and the few participating British worsened the situation. One British officer, for example, freely voiced his disdain for the motley colonials. Colonel Redknap, the British engineer, "showed his dislike to undertake what he was sent about."11 Redknap announced that it was not for him to "venture all his credit and reputation with such undisciplined and ungoverned men and unconstant officers." He refused to attack the Port Royal fort. Such attitudes boded ill for the success of joint British-American military endeavors, future as well as present.15
March's forces eventually withdrew to Casco Bay in complete disarray. "In fine," declared the Boston witness, "when all was concluded to set fire to all and be gone, you might have seen the confusion of Babel, and run off he that could run fastest. In short, I think our General was both fool and boy-ridden." William Dudley, the governor's son and secretary to the expedition, corroborated this account. The troops, he informed his father, "showed a want of good discipline and order." The campaign bogged down in mid-June as the discontented forces awaited instructions. "There is nothing new for me to lay before your excellency," an officer wrote Dudley, "Colonel March is daily brewing fresh notions, but I'm afraid to no avail," Dudley sent reinforcements to Casco Bay and ordered another Port Royal attack. In August, the unhappy expedition returned to Port Royal, skirmished, and again withdrew. The returning men were not greeted fondly by a disappointed citizenry. John Winthrop described the welcome received by a contingent sent to Boston in July "to inform the Governor of their proceedings and actions at Port Royal":
They landed at Scarlet's Wharf, where they were met by several women, who saluted them after this mariner: "Welcome, soldiers!" and presented them a great wooden sword, and said withall "Fie, for shame! Pull off the iron spitts which hang by your sides; for wooden ones are all the fashion now." At which (site of the officers said, "Peace silly woman, etc.," which irritated the female tribe so much the more that they called out to one another as they passed along the streets, "Is your piss-pot charged, neighbor? Is your piss-pot charged, neighbor? So-ho, souse the cowards. Salute Port Royal."16
The Port Royal fiasco produced immediate political repercussions. Governor Dudley's enemies again charged him with treachery and grumbled about taxes. An anti-Dudley pamphlet entitled A Memorial of the Present Deplorable State of New England was circulated in 1707, a sign of real discontent. Ire at Dudley was great enough that one disgruntled writer could claim he was "credibly informed that some persons were forced to cut open their beds, and sell the feathers to pay their taxes." Boston's political atmosphere grew so heated that in November 1707, Her Majesty's Council was persuaded to pass a resolution defending Dudley. "We firmly believe and are of opinion," the Council proclaimed, "[that] the allegations thereon of the governor's trading or allowing a trade with her Majesty's enemies the French and the Indians in their interest is a scandalous and wicked accusation."17
Failure at Port Royal also worsened already bad relations between New York and Massachusetts. Samuel Sewall, Massachusetts judge and Council member, reflected the sentiments of many New Englanders when he testily contended:
For as much as the inhabitants of these provinces are all one mother's children: one noble way wherein his excellency Lord Lovelace [governor of New York] may benefit the Massachusetts is by licensing and animating the Five Nations to take up the hatchet against the French … We would be glad if our good neighbors of New York would likewise express the generosity of URIAH by a voluntary participation of the hardships of war. By this means our enemies would have enough to do at home and have little heart to insult us.18
Thus, rather than easing tensions, the 1707 Port Royal campaign exacerbated them. The expedition's failure pointed out an obvious fact: if the colonies were to successfully combat the French and Indian menace, they first must overcome the rivalries and logistical snares which so hampered them at Port Royal.
In view of the Port Royal debacle, it seems somewhat surprising that plans for another enterprise were in full swing a mere eighteen months later. Colonial interest in a new expedition may be attributed primarily to two factors. A resurgence in raids by scalping parties and French privateers in 1708 suggested once again the need for concerted action against a common enemy. More importantly, in April 1709, Samuel Vetch, aspiring imperialist and friend to Dudley, arrived in Boston with the Queen's promise of British support for an attack on Canada.
With former Virginia Governor Colonel Francis Nicholson, Vetch produced plans for a two-pronged assault on Canada. Troops from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were to attack Montreal overland from Albany. New England forces were to invade Quebec by way of the Saint Lawrence. Great Britain would supply troops and a fleet, scheduled to arrive in May. As this plan received the crown's endorsement, New York was forced to yield her neutrality.19
Vetch and Nicholson were somewhat nervous concerning colonial support for the expedition. In a proclamation issued in Massachusetts they begged that:
There might remain no ground, either from the surmises of her enemies, or the doubts of her subjects to suggest anything that might give the least shadow for a scruple, or hinder her loyal subjects from joining unanimously and cordially in the said expedition.
On this score at least, the two men need not have feared. In a marked contrast to 1707, the colonies enthusiastically plunged into preparations for the new enterprise. Even Dudley's old enemy Cotton Mather contributed; that formidable gentleman interceded personally with the Almighty for the expedition's success, "I had also some other errands unto Heaven," he noted in his journal, "A great expedition that is now forming, from Great Britain, and all these colonies, against our French neighbors, was [a] matter which I had to spread before the Lord." Perhaps due to such powerful intervention, arrangements proceeded relatively smoothly in Massachusetts. Physicians and surgeons were chosen, billeting and victualling arranged, and the price of provisions as well as officers' wages set, all with surprisingly little rancor. Matters also went well in New York. On 25 May, an advance guard left Albany for Wood Creek in upper New York, blazing a trail to Montreal.20
There were of course several predictable snags in coordination. Quaker members of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania assemblies blocked funds for troops; consequently these colonies did not contribute substantially to the expedition. Moreover, some colonists apparently indulged in unpatriotic price-gouging. Acts were passed freezing prices at levels current the day before the expedition's announcement, so that the government "might not be imposed on by…having an expensive demand made of them by means of that public and beneficial occasion." Citizens also muttered against enlistment practices. A large group of Bostonians complained that enlistment without parental consent encouraged insolence on the part of sons and servants. They instructed Dudley to "make such provisions … as in your wisdom shall be thought fit that our children and servants may not at their pleasure depart from their duties in our families." Finally, intercolonial rivalries, although suppressed, did not disappear. As a soldier at Wood Creek lamented:
There is not that true friendship and right understanding among the officers in the camps as could be wished for. There is a sort of natural emulation and animosity amongst those of the several colonies which cannot easily he removed.
Despite these difficulties, the colonies exhibited an unprecedented spirit of cooperation in preparing for the 1709 expedition. The campaign's prospects seemed bright.21
One factor, however, increasingly disturbed the colonists: the promised British fleet did not arrive. Throughout the summer the colonists waited uneasily. "The force not being arrived disheartens the men at the camp, but more especially those people that live here in this city and country," commented a member of the Wood Creek forces. Frustrated by the delay and chagrined to be denied booty once more, the troops grew restless. By September, Sir Charles Hobby, leader of the Massachusetts first regiment was moved to petition for assistance. He claimed "that the soldiers belonging to the said regiment are poor men and most of them have families to maintain and having had no wages are under great shifts for money to buy provisions." Enthusiasm for the expedition faltered as desertion and disease decimated the ranks. Desperate to salvage the campaign, Vetch suggested an attack on Port Royal. The colonies were reluctant to act without word from Great Britain. Finally, on 16 October, Vetch received a dispatch from the mother country informing him that the enterprise had been "laid aside" in July. With a cavalier disregard of colonial concerns, Britain neglected to inform the colonies immediately of the expedition's cancellation.22
The colonists reacted with anger and dismay to the campaign's suspension. "We are groaning under the vast expense and disgrace of the disappointed expedition against Canada," Samuel Sewall wrote. In a similar statement indicating colonial upset, Gordon Saltonstall, the new governor of Connecticut, observed: "This was a very sorrowful conclusion of the summer expedition on our part, and beside the loss of our men, it has involved us in such a vast charge that I know not when we shall get out of it." The expedition's inglorious demise was indeed a "sorrowful conclusion" to an enterprise which had begun with such enthusiasm. To the disillusioned colonists, the abortive campaign underscored Great Britain's indifference to their needs. As G. N. Waller states in his biography of Samuel Vetch:
This incident was one of the many instances which sowed seeds of colonial dissatisfaction with the mother country and which had an incalculable but nonetheless real bearing on the eventual breakdown leading to the Revolution. The chance to accomplish the conquest of Canada was only postponed, but the cost of the postponement in lives and money weakened and embittered the colonists.23
At Vetch's insistence, representatives of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island met at Rehoboth, Rhode Island, in October 1709, to consider alternative plans of action. New York, incensed that its neutrality had been sacrificed in vain, refused to attend. Despite this colony's recalcitrance, the Rehoboth congress drafted a memorial to the Queen urging the resumption of the expedition the following year. The delegates also decided to assail Port Royal immediately, employing both colonial troops and the British ships then in colonial ports.24
News of the intended Port Royal assault was not received with universal enthusiasm. In Massachusetts, the House of Representatives resolved that an expedition at such a late date was "impracticable," due to insufficient sea support and the approaching winter.25 The captains of the British ships bluntly declined to participate in the proposed campaign. Plans for the 1709 Port Royal attack then were scrapped. Nonetheless, the Rehoboth convention and the projected Port Royal expedition suggest an increasing willingness by the colonial governments to join in united action. Equally significant, the colonies here evinced a new if limited disposition to act independently. The colonies were beginning to initiate and to organize major military endeavors, as well as to lobby effectively to attain desired ends.26
Following the Rehoboth meeting, Colonel Francis Nicholson left for Britain, bearing the colonies' petition. Colonel Peter Schuyler of New York soon joined him, accompanied by five Mohawks sent to lend local color to the colonies' request for a new Canadian expedition. The Indians, a sensation in London, reawoke British interest in a Canadian campaign. More importantly, the British ministries changed, power shifting from Whigs to Tories. Eager for military success, the Tories agreed to support a North American enterprise. Nicholson was appointed commander-in-chief of an expedition to reduce Port Royal. With a regiment of British marines Nicholson sailed for Boston in May 1710. Meanwhile, the Tories toyed with the idea of another Canadian mission. In the summer of 1710, Viscount Shannon was appointed head of five regiments, troops were embarked and the colonies notified, only to have the Shannon campaign abruptly cancelled. The Shannon debacle seemed a further example of British insensitivity to colonial expectations.
Preparations for the 1710 Port Royal expedition continued apace, however. Nicholson arrived in July 1710, with the Queen 's instructions. These stipulated that beyond the British marines:
What is further necessary for accomplishing this defence shall be without delay furnished by the provinces and that in such quotas and by such provisions as they were to have furnished last year [if the] designed expedition to Canada had taken place.
The Massachusetts Council offered thanks to the Queen, promising to "cheerfully assist" in the expedition. Together with Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, the Bay Colony busily mustered men and gathered supplies. To encourage wary soldiers to enlist, Massachusetts offered a coat worth thirty shillings, one month's advance wages, and freedom from impressment for three years to volunteers. Firearms were also presented to soldiers as royal gifts. With such inducements Massachusetts' quota speedily was filled. 27
Nicholson set sail on 18 September. Four war ships, the province galley, and the star "bomb ketch" accompanied him, along with nearly thirty-five hundred troops. Including transports, hospital ships and storeships, the flotilla comprised about thirty-six vessels. Blessed with favorable winds and fair weather, the fleet made good time, arriving at Port Royal on the twenty-third. Only one accident marred the journey. A small transport, the Caesar, foundered; twenty-six men were lost.
After a council of war, Nicholson landed his troops near the Port Royal fort. The colonial forces, which vastly outnumbered the French garrison still under Governor Subercase, soon won the upper hand. Subercase pluckily resorted to guerilla warfare, dressing his Indians in English livery for surprise attacks. Such tactics merely delayed an inevitable end. Following a civilized exchange of notes between Subercase and Nicholson, the French surrendered on 1 October. Port Royal was renamed Annapolis Royal in honor of the Queen, and Samuel Vetch appointed governor of Britain's new outpost in Acadia.
The colonies exulted at the welcome news of victory at Port Royal. Governor Dudley proclaimed 16 November a day of thanksgiving, declaring: "Almighty God graciously favor[ed] us:…In prospering Her Majesty's British troops in conjunction with those of this and the neighboring governments under the command of the Honorable General Francis Nicholson." The Boston Newsletter, which ignored the disastrous 1707 and 1709 expeditions, reprinted Nicholson's journal of the Port Royal campaign.28 Even the testy Samuel Sewall rejoiced, sending friends copies of a paean to Nicholson. As Sewall's taste in poetry was somewhat dubious it suffices to quote two verses to indicate colonial reaction:
Triumph at Port Royal had several consequences. With Port Royal, Britain gained a claim to all Acadia. That area continued to be a source of friction between Great Britain and France for years to come, contributing to Dummer's War in 1723. The conquest of Port Royal also freed New England's coast from French privateers. This was a real boon to both the military and commercial establishments. Finally, as Sewall's poem suggests, the Port Royal success fueled colonial ambitions to push the French from North America. Colonies and mother country were spurred to attempt even greater cooperative ventures, including the conquest of Canada.
During the fall of 1710, the New England colonies petitioned the Queen to renew the Canadian enterprise. Massachusetts spoke for the colonies when she contended that it was:
Absolutely necessary to the repose and tranquillity of all your Majesty's northern plantations in America, that the country of Canada be reduced to your Majesty's obedience, towards which we shall cheerfully do our duty.30
In early 1711, Great Britain acquiesced. A full-scale attack on Canada was planned along the lines of the abortive 1709 expedition. Nicholson again was to lead land forces from New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey to Montreal. Rear Admiral Hovenden Walker would command a large fleet against Quebec, with Brigadier General John Hill directing British and colonial troops in that battle.
Once more, the colonies commenced preparation for a major campaign. Two events suggest the strides made by the colonial governments in their ability to undertake a large, cooperative enterprise. First, before definite news of the expedition even reached Boston, Governor Dudley instructed the General Assembly:
And because the year is already so far advanced, if we should receive her Majesty's commands thereon, it must necessarily require all possible expedition lest the season be lost. I shall be glad to see the Assembly forthwith pass through the ordinary business of the revenues, the excise, import and other articles, that we may have nothing else to do but that affair.
Second, representatives from New England and New York met in New London 20 June to discuss strategy. The Boston Newsletter reported that in "three days time they unanimously agreed on the necessary orders and resolves of the measures to be taken."31 Clearly, practice in planning previous campaigns, as well as the recognition of common interests, permitted the colonies to act with a dispatch and amiability unthinkable in 1707. Colonial jealousies of course continued. Massachusetts refused to supply additional quotas of beef and pork, arguing that the "orders and instructions for that service [were] directed to Colonel Hunter at New York." Overall, however, there was little intercolonial friction.
British-American animosity posed a far more serious threat to the expedition's success. If the 1707 Port Royal campaign exemplifies the intercolonial rivalries which hindered unified action, the 1711 Canadian expedition similarly illustrates the growing problem of British-American hostility. Relations between mother country and colonies were strained severely by this expedition.
When Hill and Walker arrived in Boston on 25 June, they brought eleven thousand men with them, a force which nearly exceeded the city's population. These men, together with over one thousand colonial troops, had to be victualled, billeted, and provisioned for the enterprise. Boston obviously faced immense logistical problems. Anxious to gather sufficient provisions, Walker and Hill did not fully appreciate Boston's dilemma. They sparred with the colonial legislatures over supplies and prices. Walker was particularly indignant and accused the colonies of stonewalling. In late July, he angrily informed Dudley:
Instead of assisting, the government of this colony have prejudiced the present expedition, notwithstanding their pretended declarations to the contrary, and how they will be able to defend themselves against so great a multitude of witnesses and so many evident matters of fact, I leave them to judge; for they may flatter themselves with a great many friends in Britain, yet when the Parliament there shall come to enquire, and be informed of the little assistance they have given in respect to the sea part of the expedition, it will produce such a resentment as perhaps New England may repent.32
Walker's continuous complaints created much ill feeling between British and colonists. His remonstrations, however, were not totally unfounded. A series of acts passed by the Massachusetts Assembly suggest that the colonists were less than generous in providing supplies. In June, commissaries were ordered to "impress all bakers, brewers, coopers, etc., who cannot or will not supply the public." In July, sheriffs were empowered to search homes for hoarded goods: "And in case any persons refuse to expose their provisions or licquors to be taken for the service, break open the doors of the store houses and cellars where they are lodged."33 Bostonians, disappointed by previous campaigns, were slow to open their purses again. Faced with such Yankee caution, Walker despairingly concluded: "The people live here as when there was no king in Israel, but everyone does what seems right in his own eyes."34
Friction between colonial and British troops worsened matters. As in 1707, the British found the makeshift style of the colonial militia appalling. Colonel Richard King, Hill's quartermaster-general, noted in disgust:
The New England troops enbarked though their transports were very far from being ready to receive them. No sailors aboard, and except provisions and water, beds and all other necessaries were in a manner wanting. The reluctance and ill nature that these people showed to serve us and forward the expedition did not near so fully demonstrate their perverse and wicked intentions as this great neglect.
Such attitudes understandably annoyed colonists. Desertion created further resentments between colonists and British. "By the encouragement and favor of the inhabitants," Walker grumbled, "great numbers of seamen deserted from the mens of wars boats." Desertion became so chronic a problem that penalties for harboring deserters were set in July at a fifty pound fine or twelve months imprisonment. British-American hostility simply increased as a result of these stern measures.35
Ignorance of the Canadian terrain and the St. Lawrence River produced additional concern. Experienced pilots were hard to procure. Walker, a man of morbid imagination, was deeply disturbed. Even before the fleet set sail for Quebec, Walker envisioned disaster; he feared his force would become icebound in Canada. "I must confess the melancholy contemplation of this ... strikes me with horror," he wrote, "for how dismal it must have been to have beheld the seas and earth locked up by Adamantine frosts, and swollen with high mountains of snow, in a barren and uncultivated region, great numbers of brave men famishing with hunger, and drawing lots who should die first to feed the rest, without the least appearance of relief?"36
Preparations for the expedition continued despite these apprehensions. Supplies for three months were gathered, and ships outfitted. Nicholson's troops again worked their way towards Wood Creek. Nonetheless, when Walker embarked on 30 July with an armada of nine warships, two bomb ketches, and sixty transports carrying twelve thousand men, he left under a cloud of tension and doom. On 23 August, Walker's worst fantasies were fulfilled. His fleet piled up on rocks in the treacherous St. Lawrence. Seven ships and nearly nine hundred men were lost; amazingly, the colonial troops escaped unscathed. Although Walker still had a sizable force, he decided to cancel the expedition. Walker and Hill set sail for home, leaving Nicholson in an exposed position.37
The colonies were shocked by the expedition's failure and fearful for the troops at Wood Creek. "We have the dismal and awful account of our fleet's miscarriage in Canada…a dreadful story to us," wrote one Bostonian, "we must leave all to Providence, hoping he will protect those poor creatures gone by land, for whom the whole town is much concerned," While Nicholson was recalled in time to avert another disaster, the colonies were most bitter. The failure of the 1711 Canadian expedition marked the fifth time in four years that colonial hopes of ending the French and Indian threat had been dashed precipitously. It is not surprising that Governor Dudley felt "the ill consequences of this loss will be many and great to these provinces."38
Recriminations were hurled from both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of the disaster. British complaints of colonial recalcitrance were met with colonial accusations of incompetence. The debate grew so acrimonious that Dudley was forced to reassure a worried General Assembly that Massachusetts could not be charged with "neglect in any particular." "The sole apparent benefit of this great disaster," he gloomily concluded, "will be our submission unto God."39
Indian raids along the frontier resumed following the expedition's demise. Once again, the colonies petitioned for a campaign against Canada. This time, there was a notable hesitation in their pleas. Massachusetts requested:
Your Majesty's most gracious consideration of the distressing circumstances of your Majesty's good subjects of this province, so greatly enfeebled and impoverished by the war. …And for the preparations made in the two afore going years, and for this years expedition wherein we employed our utmost efforts. And that Your Majesty would be graciously pleased, if it may be, to excuse us from furnishing a quota of men for a new expedition.40
Exhausted by years of constant military preparation, the colonies could muster little enthusiasm for a new campaign. The 1711 enterprise, however, proved to be the last Canadian expedition of Queen Anne's War. Peace negotiations between Britain and France began in 1712. In 1713, Queen Anne's War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht.
IIIUnder the Peace of Utrecht, the European belligerents agreed that the French and Spanish crowns would remain separate. Louis XIV also recognized the legitimacy of Britain's Protestant succession. Great Britain thus won her major objectives in waging the War of the Spanish Succession. In addition, Britain made important commercial and industrial gains. Spain granted Britain the infamous Asiento, a monopoly of the African slave trade. France ceded the Hudson Bay area and the territory of Acadia, including Annapolis Royal, to Britain. The boundaries of these areas unfortunately were left undefined.41
Consequently, Britain and France soon resumed their struggle along the northern frontier. Rapid British expansion into the disputed areas after 1713 worried both French and Indians. Jesuit missionaries won the Abenakis Indians to the French cause, posing a threat to further settlements in Maine. Relations between the British and the French and Indians steadily deteriorated as border raids resumed. Finally, in July 1722, Massachusetts Governor Samuel Shute declared war on the eastern Indians. The conflict became known as "Dummer's War," after William Dummer, Shute's successor as governor. Dummer's War continued until 1725, when Massachusetts negotiated a favorable settlement with the Abenakis.42
The years covered by this volume thus were ones of great importance to the future direction of the American colonies. Queen Anne's Canadian expeditions established trends in intercolonial cooperation and British-American antagonism which were to continue for another two-thirds of a century. As a result of the disastrous series of British-American enterprises between 1707 and 1711, a mutual distrust between colonies and mother country was born. Colonists felt that Great Britain was insensitive to American concerns; Britain found the colonies exasperatingly uncooperative. Furthermore, hostility between British officers and the colonial armies first developed during Queen Anne's War. At Cartagena and Louisbourg, as well as with General Edward Braddock, the basic incompatibilities of colonists and regulars surfaced even more strongly. Perhaps most significantly, precedents for intercolonial cooperation were set during Queen Anne's Canadian expeditions. Over the four years from 1707 to 1711, the colonies learned to work together. As Americans considered revolution, they could look back on over fifty years of experience, however limited, in planning major cooperative military ventures. The path from Queen Anne's Canadian expeditions, then, led inexorably towards Lexington Green.
A number of individuals and institutions have contributed to the preparation of this volume. I should like to thank the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, most particularly Mr. Howard Gambrill,Jr., the Chairman of its Charitable Contribution Committee. Their generosity and support made this work possible. Thanks are also extended to the staff of the Massachusetts Archives, whose friendly cooperation expedited my research. Louis C. Tucker, director of the Massachusetts Historical Society, kindly granted permission to quote from the Society's collections. A special thanks is due Dr. James B. Bell, Director, and his helpful staff at the New England Historic Genealogical Society. I am most grateful to Dr. Ralph J. Crandall and to Catherine L. Slichter, editors of The New England Historical and Genealogical Register, for their patience and editorial skill. Myron O. Stachiw, of Boston University, offered welcome advice and encouragement. Sheila Hones, also of Boston University, deserves recognition (and admiration) for typing this tome. Finally, thanks to my parents for their never failing support and humor.
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