The mind and habits of the General Court were well hidden in the unusually arid journals of the House of Representatives. Clerk after clerk followed a similar pattern of obscuring the daily proceedings so that the record contains little more than a selected flow of business. Few votes were revealed, and the content of debates leading up to the votes was rarely noted. Sometimes official statements of policy or opinion were published, but only occasionally were the representatives who voted listed and then their names were given without explanation. Proceedings were kept secret until 1715 and thereafter published, frequently after each quarterly session, until 1779 when part of that year and all of the 1780 sessions were left in the clerk’s manuscript. The newspapers rarely illuminated debates or votes, thus compounding the secrets of legislative deliberations.
A marvelous example of legislative thinking and maneuvering, however, took place in 1770, at a time of great emotion over the Boston Massacre and the trial of the accused soldiers. The issue concerned Governor Bernard’s June 1769 removal of the legislative meeting place to Cambridge when the House protested the presence of the British fleet and army in Boston Harbor and refused to conduct business. The removal continued even after Bernard left for England in the summer of 1769, but because he prorogued the legislature until January 1770 and Hutchinson, his lieutenant governor, extended the recess until March 15, the order to remain in Cambridge depended on Bernard’s return or new action by Hutchinson. Hutchinson refused to do anything until he knew what Bernard and the home ministry desired. In the meantime, the legislature met regularly until April 26 when it adjourned for the May elections. The members were irritated, but there was a chance of new orders from London.
In late May 1770, the House of Representatives opened the first session of the newly elected body by objecting to the relocation of its usual meeting place in Boston to the chapel of Harvard College at Cambridge—a meeting place, too, but inappropriate for lawmaking. The representatives, uncomfortable and angry, continued their protest for the first two sessions by refusing to legislate. The Council more or less followed the same policy, only processing money for pensions and approving executive actions. Both bodies were aroused by Acting Governor Hutchinson’s attitude and suspicious of his explanation for keeping the legislature in Cambridge.
Before the representatives selected the Council, traditionally the first major business of the session after choosing the speaker and clerk, they drew up a strong protest over the removal of the legislature and sent a powerful committee to deliver it to the acting governor. The committee was chaired by John Hancock, and included Elisha Porter, warm friend of the acting governor; Edward Sheaffe; Stephen Hall; and James Warren. But Hutchinson managed to be absent from the council chamber when the delegation appeared and thus avoided receiving the petition. By that action, he forced the House and the retiring Council to choose the new Council before he would receive the petition or reply.1 Procedurally he was probably correct, but he surely irritated most representatives.
From the distance of 200 years, the petition seems to have been discrete, well argued, and firm. The House cited history, tradition, and the circumstances of 1770 as it questioned whether Hutchinson had the power to keep the legislature meeting in Cambridge. Also questioned was his use of the prerogatives of the crown which “extends not to do any Injury . . . [and was] created [rather] for the Benefit of the People.”2
Council selection proceeded traditionally, and a committee of representatives headed by Joseph Hawley of Northampton took the list of nominees to Acting Governor Hutchinson, who had all of the power of governor until Bernard returned from England. Selecting John Hancock and Jerathmeel Bowers for objects of contempt, he rejected them, but then approved the remaining 26 nominees. In disgust over the governor’s arrogance, Joseph Gerrish of Newbury refused to serve as councilor. The House then sent to the council chamber as attendants of the newly elected councilors John Hancock, as chairman, Bowers, and five other representatives, usually the beginning of a happy ceremony of formal introductions to the governor and induction to office. The presence of Hancock and Bowers as committeemen, however, was the House’s way of pricking Hutchinson—a practice they had used earlier in similar situations to irritate the contemptible Governor Bernard.3
Later in the day, Hutchinson cordially received the whole House of Representatives in the council chamber, gave a well-presented address, and formally opened the legislature. At one point he observed, “I wish for a happy harmony in the legislature, and I will most readily concur with you in every measure you shall propose, as far [as it] can consist with my duty to the king, and the regard I bear to the interest of the province.” That same afternoon he replied to the House protest that had been delivered to him in the meantime. He asserted his right to use the prerogative power of his office, and he avoided telling the truth, at least in spirit, by insisting that he could not return the legislature to Boston: “I cannot remove the court from Cambridge, until I know more of his Majesty’s Pleasure than I do at present.”4
The entire ceremony lasted about an hour, with the representatives crowded into the room and standing encircling the councilors. At the conclusion of Hutchinson’s dignified address, the representatives withdrew to their meeting hall, sat down amid much noise, and awaited Cushing’s call to order. Hutchinson’s address had sufficiently provoked the representatives to appoint immediately a committee with Speaker Thomas Cushing, John Hancock, Samuel Adams, Daniel Leonard, and five others, and to order a study of what was needed to be done. The committee responded quickly that the House should ask Hutchinson for a copy of his instructions. The House reacted promptly to the recommendation by sending Hancock, Adams, Hawley, John Worthington, and Edward Sheaffe to him. As expected, the governor refused to reveal his instructions, though he now admitted that he had not been directly ordered to continue the legislature’s exile to the wilds of Cambridge.
Angry at the explanation, the House decided to go on record and called for approval of its position by a public vote. This unusual procedure revealed that 96 of the 102 representatives present were hostile to the governor’s response. Only Timothy Ruggles, Daniel Oliver, John Worthington, Benjamin Day, Elisha Porter, and John Ingersoll supported him. They were primarily from the western parts of the colony, relatives, friends, and confidants.5
John Hancock, Richard Derby, John Adams, Jedediah Preble, and James Warren carried a report on the vote to the Council, which was at this point still a spectator. It received the committee promptly and expressed its warm support. In the meantime, the irritated House members developed some resolutions, which were voted on and sent by a committee to the acting governor. This ceremony did not disguise the rising emotion and drew from the loquacious Hutchinson an immediate reply. The governor, as might be expected, drew himself up to his full dignity and pronounced, “I know his Majesty’s Pleasure.” A prepared copy of his full remarks was then sent to the House for a public reading.
A few days later after many hours of writing, another House committee, chaired by Hawley and including Samuel and John Adams, John Pickering, Daniel Leonard, and a few new representatives, provided a statement of the House decision not to conduct business until the legislature was returned to Boston. This decision to delay action on hundreds of petitions would affect the whole colony, could annoy petitioners, and might eventually boomerang against individual legislators. Another vote, 77 to 3, put the House again on record. Of the earlier minority, only Day, Porter, and Ingersoll remained. At least 30 representatives did not vote, including the governor’s friend John Worthington and relative Daniel Oliver who were in town.6
At this point, the Council formally joined the House in protesting the relocation of the legislature at Cambridge. Three Council members, Royall Tyler, Joshua Henshaw, and James Humphrey, addressed Hutchinson in a long, well-presented paper that questioned Hutchinson’s authority in a slightly different fashion than the House paper, but with the same impact. The Council assured Hutchinson that although he had the power to relocate the legislature anywhere he wished without consulting the British ministry or the Council, tradition, practice, and facilities had plainly established the seat of government at Boston. “In the present Case, when every Reason, arising from Convenience, Safety and Utility, demonstrates and urges the Fitness of the Court’s sitting in Boston, the convening and keeping it elsewhere, contrary to the Mind of the Two Houses, and the Province in general, we humbly apprehend is an Exercise of the Prerogative, if not against Law, yet certainly against ancient Usage, and unwarranted by the Reason which supports all Prerogative, namely the public Good.”7 After reading the address itself, the House moved to publish all the earlier ones, instructing Hancock, John Adams, and William Heath to prepare them for the press.
Goaded by these actions, Hutchinson hastened to repeat his past arguments, but the House would not let him have the last word. Two committees were appointed—one to formulate a response and the other to deliver it. The governor had the bittersweet pleasure of seeing Hancock, Samuel and John Adams, Woodbridge Brown, and David Ingersoll again, but he now responded that he intended to give the legislature a recess because the proceedings of the House and Council made it absolutely clear to him that the members would not do their duty as legislators.8 The Council, moreover, delivered another lengthy message, perhaps now stronger and blunter in language. In some ways, the Council embarrassed the governor by lecturing him on the charter, his powers, and his conduct, and ending with a contemptuous request for him to read his instructions. Obviously it wanted to hear the reason for his stubbornness—“If instructions are to be the Law and Rule of Government, is it not fit and proper, that they should be known? Are we not, otherwise, . . . in a state of Vassallage.”9 Tension must have been great because these men, including the governor, were all New Englanders and well acquainted in
politics.
The House finally decided a recess was better than this bickering. Audiences with Hutchinson confirmed this opinion, but he now had referred in his messages to possible dispatches from London, and until they arrived, he promised only brief recesses. The members, however, decided to test his position one final time. By a unanimous vote of available members, they formed a committee of the Speaker, Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Pickering, and John Gallison and asked the committee to draw up a simple request for a recess and deliver it. The request took a certain amount of courage in anticipating the support
of the people. As time was passing, the legislative work was mounting and problems back home were pressing. The weary governor, well aware of these pressures, reluctantly accepted the request and prorogued the General Court to July 25. Many who had anticipated the recess had hastened home, angry at the waste of time in Cambridge and wondering about the reaction of their constituents. They hoped a few weeks at home would be better than a month in the halls of Harvard.
That humid morning of July 25 in Cambridge, 40 members of the House had already gathered to form a quorum. Most of the Council were likewise in their seats. Two late representatives (Benjamin Chadbourne and Jonathan Greenleaf) were sworn in, and then the whole House went upstairs to the philosophy chamber for the governor’s speech opening the second session. Long by the standards of the day, the speech repeated what had been said before: “it is not in my power to remove you to Boston.”10 On their return to the chapel, the members of the House had the clerk read the speech and then they debated the motion that the House reconfirm its determination to refrain from business until the legislature was returned to Boston. On July 26, the House again voted unanimously (72 members) to reaffirm their decision. (In the meantime, late member Benjamin Akin had arrived.) They appointed a committee to advise the governor of their feelings, and Speaker Cushing, Hancock, Leonard, Samuel and John Adams, Thomas Denny, and John Gallison began work on a reply to the governor’s address that would also emphasize the importance of their public vote.
On August 1, the Committee, minus Daniel Leonard, again climbed the stairs to the council chamber and presented a brutally long paper, which had earlier been “debated Paragraph by Paragraph” in the House and passed unanimously by those present. The members were generally incensed and all but called the governor a liar for misrepresenting British policy. “This House have great Reason to doubt, whether it is, or ever was his Majesty’s Pleasure that your Honor should meet the Assembly at Cambridge, or that he has ever taken the Matter under his Royal Consideration: Because, the common and the best Evidence in such Cases, is not communicated to us.”11
Hutchinson’s actions, they felt, were contemptible, but he felt otherwise and used his support of the royal government to justify the irritation he was now causing. Though his temper began to wear, he refused to hand over his instructions because “I know it to be his Majesty’s Pleasure that I should not communicate them, and the Restraint I am under appears, to me to be founded upon wise Reasons.” Because the House had asked whether his instructions came from the king or ministers and emphasized the danger of encroachments from wicked ministers, Hutchinson tried to nail this accusation. All
instructions, he said, came from the King, and the House was “coarse and indecent” in its aspersion.12 The battle intensified but Hutchinson had had enough slander for the present. He prorogued the legislature until September 5 and then extended it until September 26, calculating that the legislators would have time to consult their fellow townsmen who would demand legislative action.
On the opening day of the third session, a committee hastened to the governor, even before his address was presented to the legislature, seeking return of the houses to Boston. Though John Hancock spoke well for the entire House, his committee membership reflected some opposition to continuing the argument with Hutchinson—possibly the committee, excepting Hancock, was ready to compromise, but it was willing to make one last plea to remove the legislature to Boston. Hutchinson surely sensed the division of support and argued instead for the legislature to transact in Cambridge its normal business which he now regarded as pressing because of the summer recess.13
The House members returned to their chamber to hear the governor’s speech again. Then Cushing was appointed to chair a committee to recommend a new course of action. His colleagues, except for George Godfrey of Taunton and Humphrey Hobson, were the regular leaders of the governor’s opposition, but they now questioned whether to continue the current boycott. Attendance was low in the House, and messengers were already sent out to round up the missing representatives. Daniel Davis and Moses Marcy were qualified as new members, and a day of solemn prayer was set for the coming Wednesday. The Reverend Mr. Nathaniel Appleton of Cambridge was chosen to conduct the services. A committee consisting of Humphrey Hobson, William Billings, and Thomas Gardner handled the arrangements and secured a nearby meeting house for Appleton’s sermon.
Before seeking the inspiration of God, some members wanted to question Hutchinson on the unclear items in his last address. He had claimed receiving an Order in Council, dated July 6, which would place the affairs of Massachusetts before Parliament for review and which could be a threat to the colony. Facing the danger of British intervention, the House instructed Hancock, John Adams, David Ingersoll, Samuel Adams, and Abraham Fuller to draw up a message of inquiry, which they quickly did. They would ask Hutchinson, in their paper, if he had received any new instructions “relating to the Continuance of this Assembly out of its ancient, legal and only convenient Place the Town-House in Boston.”
Approved by the House, the resolution was taken to the governor by John Hancock and an entirely new committee: John Pickering, William Heath, Aaron Wood, and Ebenezer Thayer. Hutchinson’s response was brief, if not loquacious, and it firmly dismissed the committee with these remarks: “His Majesty has . . . expressed his entire Approbation of my summoning the Court to meet at Cambridge, I am refrained from removing it to Boston. . . . I am willing to meet the Court at any [other] Town in the Province.”
His stern, but terse message brought to a head the need to discuss a future course of action. A new committee, chaired by John Murray of Rutland, and consisting of Joseph Gerrish, John and Samuel Adams, and Jedediah Preble, debated what should be done. Another committee, chaired by John Adams and composed of Samuel Adams, John Hancock, David Ingersoll, and Moses Bullen, drew up a possible response to the governor. Apparently they wanted to press the argument still further, but the House voted down their response and immediately selected another committee of Aaron Wood, Hancock, Preble, Samuel Adams, and Richard Read. This committee asked the House one short question: “Whether this House will proceed to the public Business in the Town of Cambridge?” Much debate occurred over several days, but finally a decision was reached. The vote was 59 to 29 to “proceed to the public Business only from absolute necessity.”14 Undoubtedly the vote was painful, possibly bitter, but a compromise.
Apparently John Adams was angry over this legislative retreat and refused to vote. James Warren, John Worthington, Timothy Ruggles, and about 25 others withheld their votes. Even Thomas Cushing stepped aside. A few days after the vote, while the leadership was still evaluating the event, John Adams and James Warren secured permission to add their names to the opposition vote.15 The great shift of members might be attributed to a split in leadership. Many of the nonactive members also joined the victorious group.
Two parliamentary maneuvers became obvious as the dispute continued. Absent members were urged to attend daily sessions, and to fill vacancies, new men were chosen in the towns and pressed to attend the House. At least ten new men arrived in Cambridge and joined in the debates, and some were immediately rewarded with seats on the committees. John Murray was an apparent recruit for Hutchinson’s forces. Since May, at least 27 separate committees were used to write the documents and visit the governor—perhaps 40 different representatives served on them. Toward the climax of the argument, new people were often added, but leaders like Hancock, Cushing, and the Adamses were always visible. Representatives like Abraham Fuller, David Ingersoll, Henry Gardner, and John Pickering seemed to gain prominence at the expense of the established leaders. For a time, after the final vote on October 9, the prominence of older leaders was definitely lessened, or did they just relax and regroup after a well-exercised contest? Such men as Timothy Ruggles, John Worthington, and Jonas Dix, Hutchinson friends, accepted seats on committees and, presumably, were influential in the later business of the session.16
The House leadership, split or not, was still united on one issue—that the legislature should not remain in Cambridge. Instead of being content with his victory, Hutchinson now had other plans. He bewildered and surprised the House by calling attention to an illegal, if slight, variance in the heading of bills that he said would make it impossible to approve any future legislation. In his first message to the legislature, he cited a fifth instruction that required all laws to be enacted “by the Governor, Council and House of Representatives.”17 The legislature had varied the heading only recently, returning to a practice followed for years after 1691. The House gave the matter to a committee, chaired by Daniel Leonard of Taunton, which included among others John and Samuel Adams, Hawley, and Ingersoll. The committee replied that “the words in General Court assembled, are not merely words of form, but of substance, and necessary to the validity of every Act. . . . We find the words . . . constantly and invariably used within thirty years past.”18
The House then asked the secretary of the colony to deliver a copy of the instruction to the clerk of the House. After some investigation, the clerk was told that no copy existed, and the secretary supposed “it was destroyed when the Court-House was burnt in 1747.”19
Viewing the legislative reply as a challenge to the authority of the British government, Hutchinson sent another message. “I cannot depart from my Instruction,” he wrote, “nor make my humble Application [to the ministry] that it may be withdrawn, unless I could see that it is an abridgment of your rights or tended to subject the province to inconvenience.” His position had become rigid, and he calculated that the legislature could not win its argument because he could veto all pending legislation and restore the earlier stalemate, which the House wanted to avoid.
The House promptly handed the message to another committee, chaired by Joseph Hawley and enlarged to include John Adams. The resulting report was sharper, blunter, and longer than the reply earlier; perhaps more important, it was feisty. The committee repeatedly refuted Hutchinson’s assertions and belittled the petty policy he was following as ultimately dangerous to the colony’s liberties and institutions. The legislature, nonetheless, changed the heading of pending bills to incorporate the governor’s formula.20 Though helpless in this fight over the prerogative, many representatives were bitter but puzzled by Hutchinson’s strategy. They reminded him, however, that he acted illegally in keeping the legislature at Cambridge.
Never willing to miss an opportunity, Hutchinson dared to respond. Cooly logical, he answered argument after argument and mused sarcastically that the House did more work in Cambridge than it had ever done in Boston. He could not refrain from adding a personal note—“I should not do myself Injustice if I did not observe, that it gives me great satisfaction to reflect that when you are, by every way in your Power, seeking to impeach my Conduct since I have been in the Chair, you have been unsuccessful in every attempt.” The House got the last word, however, when it added a series of resolutions to the Journal, including its disputes with Hutchinson and emphasizing that he had never “assigned any Reason” for removing the legislature from Boston. In its final session in April 1771, the legislature used “General Court Assembled” as a heading for three bills, and Hutchinson, as he promised, dutifully vetoed them.21 It is difficult to measure the hatred toward Hutchinson, but even his friends questioned his tactics.
The British government had not directly ordered the continued presence of the General Court in Cambridge. Hutchinson justified his maneuver as “political necessity,” believing that a recommendation from the secretary of state for the colonies had the force of an order by the change of circumstances in Boston. Hutchinson was intentionally deceitful, however, and unnecessarily angered the legislature. He rejoiced outwardly over his success in breaking the opposition, but his victory only “added one more increment to the growing belief that he was a dissembler.”22 Thomas Pownall, the English friend of many Bostonians and a former governor, told James Bowdoin that he believed that moving the capital to Cambridge was illegal.23
Despite the breakup of the majority, legislative leadership regrouped after October 9, challenging Hutchinson’s supporters and continuing as a threatening force (the asterisk indicates the leaders):
All Comm.
Chairs after (Oct. 9--)
All Comm.
Chairs after (Oct. 9--)
John Hancock*
78
21
Thomas Denny*
28
9
David Ingersoll
58
11
John Adams*
28
7
Samuel Adams*
49
9
James Warren*
24
3
William Heath*
37
10
Joseph Gerrish*
23
4
Ebenezer Thayer*
31
3
Elisha Porter
23
2
Jedediah Preble
31
4
Humphrey Hobson
23
3
Joseph Hawley*
31
10
Samuel Holton
21
2
Henry Gardner
29
6
Jonas Dix
21
6
The General Court remained in Cambridge until June 1772 when Hutchinson let it return to Boston. The legislators could not say much more about the illegality of the removal and the inconveniences of residence in a country town. The House did remind the governor during the final session of the 1770-1771 legislature about its grievance and sent up a committee, chaired by Samuel Adams, to ask that the legislature be returned to “its ancient and legal Seat.” Hutchinson’s brief reply emphasized that he could not return the Court to Boston until it admitted its error—“whilst you continue to urge that by Law the Court must be held in Boston, I may not ask his Majesty’s leave to carry you there.”24
In April 1771, the wind was out of the legislative sails. The representatives were ready to conclude the year of business and go home, so no further significant response was thus made. No additional public vote was taken on the subject, but the House tested Hutchinson in the 1771-1772 legislature and he absolutely refused to admit that he had power to change the seat of the legislature.25 Public votes like those in the 1770-1771 legislature were periodically taken in the House; about 35 were recorded in the Journals or the newspapers for the entire period before the Revolution. Most votes were taken on emotional occasions when the legislature wanted the constituents to know its feelings and stiffen the backs of its members.
A particularly significant vote was taken on May 28, 1773, when the legislature of Virginia asked the House to form a standing committee to correspond with other colonies about political conditions. The House resolved to elect 15 representatives who would “obtain the most . . . authentick Intelligence of all such Acts and Resolutions of the British Parliament . . . as may relate to, or affect, the British Colonies in America.” The 109 to 4 vote was slightly short of the full membership, but it included most of the major representatives. However, 30 towns were fined for not sending delegates, which may be significant in the politics of the day. The recorded minority included Abijah White, Thomas Gilbert, Jeremiah Learned, and John Murray. In other 1773 votes, the minority increased to nine. When the question of impeaching Peter Oliver was put to a vote, the majority decreased slightly, but did not rush to qualify new representatives.
Almost no legislative year had more than one public vote, but a few times during the 1750s, feeling the pressure of war, the House allowed itself the luxury of several votes. In 1753, there were actually four public votes, and in 1754 and 1755 three apiece. The debates and votes in none of these years had the unity of a single issue or an opponent like Hutchinson in 1770-1771.
The interesting revelations of votes in the 1750s are the split in House leadership and the many absences of members. Apparently the presiding officer, Thomas Hubbard, let committeemen do the necessary work, but the House often voted independently of the committees’ efforts. The House leadership may have preferred the low attendance. Business was processed quickly, and the membership followed what was recommended. Issues of the moment, however, probably drew in people who had been away on private business, as with the 1753 argument over the bonding of the colony’s treasurer. Some members wanted him to take an oath of office; others pushed for a surety bond; and both groups forced the calling of a public vote, with 71 to 13 favoring stricter controls over his office. Of the majority, 56 votes were those of people who had taken little or no part in the usual business of the House. Four of the eleven most active committeemen (holding 240 seats) were in the opposition. Regional differences did not seem to play a part in the decision.26
A similar vote occurred in September 1753 when the House registered its opinion on the currency: “to establish the Rate and Currency of Gold within this Government.” Three years earlier, the colony had received gold and silver from England in payment of war debts incurred in the 1740s and had been encouraged to establish a hard money currency. This bill was undoubtedly intended to readjust the amount of hard money that backed the paper currency. The opposition perceived this vote as an opportunity to increase the money supply, but the House vote was 53 to 25, rather light for such an important issue, and a denial of inflation. Many non-committee legislators joined the majority, but many committeemen were severely divided or discretely absent. Of the 11 representatives with the most committee seats, only five voted for the measure, three against, and three were absent. In perhaps a slight clash between city and country members, three Boston members voted no and one was absent. Four or five prominent members from Maine voted yes.27
The third public vote, in January 1754, involved a request by Governor Shirley who had returned from serving as a peace commissioner in Paris for nearly three years. The governor wanted additional compensation for some services he had performed in London on behalf of the colony. The legislature had already given him a generous £1,400, but he desired recognition for his services. Also, by holding a public vote, he could single out his friends, note their appreciation for his devoted service to the colony, and test their loyalty to him. The result of the vote, however, probably surprised him. The opposition leaders—James Allen, Joseph Williams, and Samuel Livermore—succeeded in getting a 44 to 41 vote against the grant. Three of the most active committeemen joined the opposition, making the difference. More non-committee people opposed the grant than favored it. Friends Otis, Worthington, Samuel Welles, and James Bowdoin approved, but Speaker Thomas Hubbard, Clerk Roland Cotton, and 17 others did not vote, which may indicate the partisan spirit of the debate.28
The fourth vote of the session again concerned the conduct of the treasurer, who was winding up the business of his office. A House committee, presided over by the speaker, recommended that additional money be given the treasurer so that he could settle his accounts. But a minority group, led by James Otis, was hostile because the shortage of over £2,000 seemed excessive. After much debate, the House voted (42 to 23) strongly against the treasurer’s grant, and the majority immediately moved to initiate court action to force payment of the missing money. Many members were absent and traveling to their homes, but enough were still in the city to vote. Non-committeemen and those with little service generally made up the vote. James Otis apparently led the opposition on the floor. His attitude may also have reflected the opinion of the governor, but his followers were strikingly different from the minority group that lost on the governor’s salary.29
The non-committeemen who played an important part in these votes were not frontiersmen, as might be expected. They came mostly from eastern and coastal counties. Only four of the 20 representatives came from Hampshire, Worcester, and York counties. Many had not hitherto been elected to the House, but one had served nine terms and three others had served three terms apiece. Three representatives, Joseph Bent, Peter Coolidge, and Josiah Taft, turned up for every vote and usually took the same side. Bent—a blacksmith, farmer, and militia captain—served only this term in the House. He died in the 1755 campaign against French Canada. Josiah Taft also died early and served only one term, but he was extraordinarily active in Uxbridge as town clerk, selectman, militia member, and farmer.
This review of legislative action on four public votes indicates a leadership that did not always agree with itself and regularly split on issues. Only a few individuals conducted the daily business of the House, debating the issues and preparing the reports. Public votes in other years also indicate a leadership that divided and opposed itself, but at least the individuals followed their own judgments, prejudices, and loyalties. Routine petitions and bills may have been processed with extensive debates and the resulting divisions reversed committee action, but more likely, routine legislation passed easily through the House and Council because the votes reflected support of the committee system and the leaders’ work. Otherwise, why would the leaders engage in such routine drudgery if they always faced a hostile group of non-committeemen who would gang up to vote down their recommendations?
If the mind of the legislature was not always revealed in the public votes, perhaps their habits show up more strongly instead. Many significant issues, like continuing salary for the governor, were not recorded with a public vote, even though the dispute lingered during the administrations of three governors. The occasional disagreements between the houses over prerogatives never brought out a public vote. Both houses instead held tenaciously to their privilege of keeping their proceedings private, and few disclosures of their debates ever reached the public print. Sometimes legislators who seemed to be taking notes during debates were scrutinized. In the l760s and 1770s, there was a House gallery, but reporters were apparently not permitted to give day-by-day accounts to the press. The public reports of votes were not widely circulated and were generally unknown to the public—unless one were an avid reader of the journals, which were eventually printed, deposited in town offices, and given to representatives.30 Members of the houses tried to avoid a public position on many issues. A 15 to 25 percent absentee rate almost always obscured the public votes in the House. When James Allen of Boston was expelled in 1748, 70 percent of the House opposition was not listed as individuals. Who ordered the public vote on Allen? The vote was admittedly unusual, but on many occasions, 30 percent and more of House members were absent during an important public vote. Such absences as listed here are suggestive of legislative conduct—perhaps a legislative desire for secrecy.
Issue
Voting %
No Record %
Currency Reform I, 1748
38.83
61.17
Currency Reform II, 1750
87.78
12.22
Currency Reform III, 1750
87.78
12.22
Currency Reform IV, 1750
66.67
33.33
Colonial Union, 1754
72.04
27.36
Grant for Agent, 1758
69.90
30.10
Provision for Troops, 1763
65.81
34.19
Impeach Chief Justice, 1773
75.76
24.24
The issue that drew more public votes than any other was the currency of the colony. It took many forms from 1739 to 1761, but no issue aroused the emotions and bitterness of legislators and constituents more than inflation, deflation, and banking. The climax over financial policy came in 1748-1750. The British ministry had suggested that Massachusetts use its compensation for war expenditures at Louisbourg (1745) and in the 1746 and 1747 campaigns to set up a hard money currency. Thomas Hutchinson, in his History of Massachusetts-Bay, took credit for introducing a plan into the legislature. The grant, he calculated, would redeem most of the outstanding paper currency and the remainder of the paper could be withdrawn by a special tax. Free of its paper money, the colony would have the benefits of a new hard currency.31
When Hutchinson took the proposal to Governor Shirley to win his support, Shirley cautioned him about the dangers of an opposition but encouraged him to go ahead because of their long experience with depreciating paper money and the general attitude of the British Ministry. A newspaper writer sounded the same tone, admitting that “I am one of those who rejoice with trembling [in anticipation of a hard currency]—Indeed, no one can be insensible that a right Improvement of this Grant must have a happy tendency to give us some Relief, and no one ought to be insensible that an imprudent management of it, will serve to plunge us still deeper in Distress.” Despite the danger, Shirley urged his friends Robert Hale and John Choate to help Hutchinson, and they, in turn, obtained the assistance of others. The 1748 session, however, was busy; inflation and auditing past war expenditures were among the most pressing problems. Members had also to deal with James Allen’s sensational accusations from the House floor. In December, Shirley delivered a brief message in which he raised the problem of curtailing inflation by currency reform. The legislature took his message under serious consideration and asked the Council to join in the discussions. A committee of nine representatives and additional councilors, chaired by Hutchinson, deliberated for only a few days and reported out a bill. Its readings also progressed rapidly, once the leadership was certain of success. The plan would redeem the paper currency and substitute another one that would be gold and silver based. Another committee, chaired again by Hutchinson, with Choate, Otis, and six other representatives, studied a tax proposal and voted out a bill in two days. A series of debates began in which the whole House became a committee. Captain John Hobson of Rowley chaired the deliberations, which spread over a few days and featured explosive language, but finally the bill was engrossed and ready for passage.32
At this climax a sufficient number of critics of the bill got control of the floor, and in the excitement of the resulting debate, pushed through several negative votes, which all but killed the bill for 1748. The full list of representatives taking part in the debate apparently was not printed, but 34 who favored the bill publicized their names, including active leaders Choate, Hale, Joseph Heath, James Otis, and Thomas Foster and only five non-committeemen. Many of these men were known opponents of James Allen, whom they helped expel from the House, probably for his remarks on the currency reform, the war indemnity, and the governor.
The smoke had hardly cleared when supporters of the supposedly dead bill organized a surprise counterattack. They secured a reconsideration of the bill, which Hutchinson said was unusual parliamentary procedure, and pushed for immediate passage. They convinced two members of their late opposition, Joseph Livermore and Samuel Witt, to join them. One of these new-found friends resurrected the dead bill and the other seconded it, and the bill passed all readings in a few hours. When the Council and governor acted their parts, the bill became law.33
While the bill was passing its final hurdles, many members were well on their way home, and perhaps the passage of the bill was secured by their absence. News of the parliamentary action, however, created much anger, as it rightly should have, and immediately affected the May elections being held in the towns. Country orators undoubtedly roared their disapproval to the assembled town meetings, damaging anyone who had voted for the bill. In Boston, Hutchinson lost his seat, and elsewhere about 40 representatives were not returned to office, for example, Robert Hale of Beverly and William Collins of Lynn. Considering that some men may not have wished reelection, roughly 25 representatives were probably purged. Some seven to ten towns not represented in 1748, particularly in Worcester County, now elected delegates for the 1749 legislature. To replace defeated Speaker Hutchinson, the House turned to Joseph Dwight, who was in his tenth term as representative of Brookfield.34
Although tempers were frayed in the 1749-1750 legislature, no public votes were taken, but hostility was often expressed openly toward Shirley, who left Massachusetts in early 1750 for London and Paris to serve on a boundary commission. In May 1750, the annual elections revealed a sharp change of representatives, perhaps a reaction to the deflationary measures passed in 1749 and the absence of the governor, a powerful, stabilizing force in the colony. Remarkably, nearly 60 representatives lost their seats. No doubt some were tired of Boston and the legislature, or had accomplished their tasks, or had secured a preferment and chose not to be reelected. John Choate, Samuel Witt, Joseph Dwight, and John Hobson were missing from the 1750-1751 House of Representatives, while James Otis, Sr., and his friends Thomas Foster of Plymouth and Samuel Tupper of Sandwich were prominent survivors. The diminished position of Otis and Foster in the new House was obvious in the first session when both drew fewer committee assignments.35
The 1750-1751 legislature was not entirely devoted to solving currency and credit problems. It opened by contesting the procedure for choosing the attorney general and took much time presenting arguments. The debates were probably an outburst of rivalry, but the House’s argument is interesting nonetheless. Since 1715, the attorney general was the mutual appointee of both houses instead of the Council and governor:
Every Board since [1715] have acknowledged the Right of the House . . . for thirty-five years . . . [to join in making appointments]. And since this matter had been solemnly settled, . . . it was surprising to the House when they received a message from the honorable Board, refusing to join with them in the choice of an attorney general this present year, and [they] are sensibly affected to observe, that the Board are so earnest to take so valuable a privilege from the House: So that it is not from any Love . . . for Disputes, but . . . for the publick Good and Liberties of the People, that House members . . . look upon themselves obliged to assert . . . the undoubted Right of the House of Representatives . . . [to have a part in the making of appointments], and nothing that the Board hath offered . . . hath altered their minds.
A committee chaired by Colonel Thomas Clap sent its message to the Council, which then sent it to committee and let it remain there until January 1751. Councilors readily admitted their inconsistent conduct over the years, but they now reinterpreted the provisions of the charter and were determined to recover lost rights under the charter that excluded the House of Representatives from the decision. The Board then joined the acting governor in selecting Edmund Trowbridge as attorney general.36
Curiously, an issue that inspired so much debate in the fall of 1750 disappeared in the winter session. The House did not reply to the Council and seemed occupied with other issues, including petitions from former soldiers, probate matters, tax inequities, and salary allotments. These serious issues initiated some committee action, but the currency redemption since May was probably the central and mounting problem of the year. The problem surfaced late in the season when the House asked for a joint committee “to project some proper method for the speedy Redemption of the Bills of Credit.”37 The committee was chaired by Speaker Hubbard and included James Allen, Chambers Russell, James Otis, John Tyng, Harrison Gray, and Thomas Foster. Its membership suggests that it favored hard currency and deflation. However, in three days, a split committee reported out a bill in the House that favored inflation and secured, without much opposition, a first and second reading.
A few days later, the now visible opposition attacked the heart of the bill, the provision to set the rate of exchange on government notes and declare them legal tender. It was obviously an attack on those favoring deflation. The House called for a public vote on deleting the provision that would set the rate of exchange and declaring the notes legal tender. Two successive votes by the inflationists carried the House, finding in each case Otis, Russell, Hubbard, and Foster in the minority. The leadership groups divided severely, but Thomas Clap, James Allen, John Tyng, and Harrison Gray were in the majority. Only Hubbard, of the four Boston representatives, stood with the deflationists. Apparently these votes were as much an attack on the basic law to establish a hard currency as they were for a way to increase the amount of paper money in circulation. Most legislators registered their opinion in these votes, and publicity may have been the purpose of the votes.38
The issue apparently aroused much bitterness. Leaders consulted each other on strategy. Ten days later, a bill to restrict inflation was resurrected and read again, but a majority refused a third reading. Thomas Clap was immediately sent to the Council to ask for the defeated bill, but was told that the Council had amended it in the meantime and was returning it to the House. Such complications probably winded Clap and his colleagues because the bill remained alive despite the House’s negative vote. The Council’s amended bill was a compromise, maybe a little less inflationary than the original. Another public vote taken almost immediately favored the compromise by a slight margin (31 to 28). Most refrained from voting, including the speaker, but Israel Williams, who apparently arrived late in the legislative year, voted with the supporters of a hard currency. Because the vote settled nothing, the acting governor, Spencer Phips, was asked to veto it. Phips responded by condemning the bill as dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the colony. “Therefore, I cannot give my consent to it.”39
The April session was nearly ended when the vetoed bill was curiously revived and amended to satisfy Phips. It quickly passed the various House readings, got Council approval, and was given to the acting governor for signature. Provisions for making certificates legal tender were dropped, and the lengthy maneuvering was ended. In 1751, the legislature would not attempt to increase the paper currency, but would try to redeem on schedule what was emitted before the hard currency act had become law.40
These votes reveal very well the forces of inflation and deflation. Boston representatives Allen, Tyng, and Gray, along with Thomas Clap of Taunton, Joseph Williams of Roxbury, Joseph Crosby of Braintree, and Joseph Buchminster of Framingham, were influential and visible in the debates. In opposition were Thomas Hubbard of Boston, James Russell of Charlestown, Chambers Russell of Concord, and James Otis of Barnstable. Though not organized as a party, these men generally acted together. They corresponded, met in Boston inns, and roomed in the same places. As the years passed, Allen’s friends changed gradually with the annual elections, and Allen died in 1755. John Tyng succeeded him as the Boston representative and rallied many of the same people to his causes.41 Tyng was an important opposition leader for a few years. Otis remained powerful until 1757 when he retired to his Barnstable homestead. The recall of Governor Shirley in 1756 apparently had some bearing on Otis’s fortunes. For men like Otis, politics was a cast of acquaintances, supporters of regional and provincial issues, and groups of people with similar philosophies.
The public votes may not tell much about the daily legislative habits of the House, but they reveal voting combinations in times of concern and groups that seem tied together by such issues as currency, dislike of the governors, and fear of colonial union. Some public votes allow researchers to penetrate the obscurity of colonial politics and share with the legislators the intense drama of an issue of common concern. Certainly Hutchinson came alive as a political figure in 1770. An extraordinarily capable person, he was daring, deceptive, and dishonest in a contest in which he put a misguided loyalty to the Crown above the public interest. His legislative friends and enemies generally did not appreciate his tactics. His leadership in bringing hard currency reform in 1748 was not so visible as his 1770 tactics, but it was bold, creative, and enduring, even though he had to finish his work outside of the House. Because the representatives had a habit of voting their feelings and changing sides with the issues, their inconsistency was often difficult to explain. They could be stubborn, feisty, and tough minded, and in the contests with Governor Hutchinson they penetrated his strategy. As a legislative body, the General Court, particularly the House of Representatives, showed great vitality and a willingness to take stands for human rights, colonial liberty, and institutional integrity. In these moments of courage, the legislature rose to greatness.
NOTES
1. Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts (Boston, 1919-1990),
47: 6-7. The House immediately formed another committee—Joseph Hawley, Samuel Adams, and James Warren—to prepare a protest. A brief discussion of the removal of the legislature is in John Cary, Joseph Warren (Urbana, Ill., 1961), 98-102. William M. Fowler, The Baron of Beacon Hill: A Biography of John Hancock (Boston, 1980), 129-131. Donald C. Lord and Robert M. Calhoon, “The Removal of the Massachusetts General Court from Boston . . .”, The Journal of American History, 55: 735-755.
2. Journals of the House of Representatives, 47: 7. In these early weeks of the controversy, Hutchinson was still lieutenant governor. His commission would reach Boston in March 1771.
3. Ibid., 9. Hutchinson’s advisors, Timothy Ruggles and John Worthington, cautioned him about too many negatives of councilors—Hutchinson to Francis Bernard, June 1, 1770, Hutchinson Papers, 26, Massachusetts Archives.
4. Journals of the House of Representatives, 47: 11-13.
5. Ibid., 17-18.
6. Ibid., 31-32. John Ingersoll of Westfield (1731-1792) continued to show his pro-British spirit into the Revolution. He was then serving his first term in the House. He was regularly elected as selectman in Westfield.
7. Ibid., 32-36 (quotation on page 35).
8. Ibid., 44.
9. Ibid., 39-43.
10. Ibid., 59-61.
11. Ibid., 63-71.
12. Ibid., 73-78.
13. Ibid., 79-82. One reason for Hutchinson’s maneuvering was the absence of his friends, Worthington, Ruggles, and John Murray—“nor any one capable of opposing Adams, Inc.” Hutchinson to Bernard, August 4, 1770, Hutchinson Papers Massachusetts Archives.
14. Journals of the House of Representatives, 47: 90-91.
15. Ibid., 97-98.
16. Jonas Dix of Waltham (1721-1783) had first come to the House in 1764 and served in almost every legislature until 1781. He was active in his town as selectman, assessor, town clerk, treasurer, and moderator and, undoubtedly, accumulated enough fees along with his farming activities to live well. Though he supported a continuance of business by the House, he does not appear to be a potential loyalist.
17. Journals of the House of Representatives, 47: 128.
18. Ibid., 134-135.
19. Ibid., 135.
20. Ibid., 145-146, 179. The governor reminded the House that seven weeks had passed without much business taking place. The House responded that he was in Milton much of the time and had convened the House to Cambridge. Otherwise, without these handicaps, much legislation could have been processed.
21. Ibid., 179-184. Hutchinson to Lord Hillsborough, May 1771, Hutchinson Papers, 27, 157-160, Massachusetts Archives.
22. Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 174-175.
23. Thomas Pownall’s evaluation is in footnote 31, ibid., 175.
24. Journals of the House of Representatives, 47: 190.
25. Ibid., 48: 11, 49-50, 115-117, 191-195. Such towns as Bedford, Holliston, Lincoln, Littleton, and Duxbury in a group of nearly 60 sent no representatives. In a letter of February 3, 1771, Hutchinson commented on this opposition: “Our Demagogues will try to revive the spirit of the Assembly, which I am obliged to meet next month. I shall not bring them to Boston.” Hutchinson Papers, 27: 112-113, Massachusetts Archives.
26. Journals of the House of Representatives, 30: 18.
27. Ibid., 88.
28. Ibid., 155.
29. Ibid., 262.
30. Every year, the House ordered the journals printed. This practice was begun in 1715 and continued until 1780. Most Massachusetts towns today have no copies of these journals and most have no record on their disappearance.
31. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.), 2: 334-336; The Independent Advertiser, March 28, 1748.
32. Journals of the House of Representatives, 25: 148-149, 171, 180, 184; The Independent Advertiser, June 20, 1748: John Hobson (1680-1770) was chosen undoubtedly because he was a senior member of the legislature. He was first elected in 1725 and was then in his 22nd year of service. In 1741, he was elected to a single term as speaker of the House.
33. Mayo, The History of Massachusetts-Bay, 2: 336-337. Hutchinson made clear in his narrative that he did not like the maneuver that gave life to the bill and secured its passage.
34. Joseph Dwight (1703-1765), a lawyer, tavern owner, soldier, and judge, was a distinguished leader who was known for his “dignified manners” and character as a gentleman. See Benjamin Dwight, History of the Descendants of John Dwight, 2 vols. (New York, 1874), 2: 625-628.
35. Otis held the most committees in the 1749 House, and fell to fifth place
in 1750 (Clap 95; Otis 64). Foster’s drop was not as spectacular—from 11th to
15th among active members. Otis’s decline was evident also in less committee
chairmanships.
36. Journals of the House of Representatives, 27: 71-75, 106-107.
37. Ibid., 181, 185.
38. Ibid., 195, 196.
39. Ibid., 215, 219, 224, 230.
40. Ibid., 230, 236.
41. Ibid., 31: 205, 213. Tyng returned to the House when James Allen died in January 1755.
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