The present volume continues a series of biographical reference works jointly published by the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the New England Historic Genealogical Society. It is designed as a partial supplement to an earlier offering in the series, Nancy S. Voye's Massachusetts Officers in the French and Indian Wars, 1748-1763 (Boston, 1975). Drawing upon records in the Massachusetts Archives, it supplies names and service data for enlisted men enrolled in the land forces of Massachusetts from 1744 to 1755 as well as for officers serving from 1744 to 1747.¹ Together the two volumes provide a readily accessible, alphabetical listing of all the soldiers contained in the Massachusetts Archives for the period 1744-1755.

Between the years 1744 and 1755 the colony of Massachusetts was in an almost constant state of war (both declared and undeclared) with the French and their Indian allies. Hostilities officially began in late May of 1744 when word reached Boston of what would become known as King George's War. The colony's troops were to play a key role in this conflict, most notably in the assault on the French fortress at Louisbourg. The "Gibraltar of the New World" fell to William Pepperrell and his Massachusetts men in June, 1745, in one of the most impressive displays of American military prowess before the Revolution. King George's War formally ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle in October, 1748, but the struggle for possession of North America continued unabated. Massachusetts was forced to maintain unceasing vigilance both on its eastern frontier in Maine (then a part of the Bay Colony) and on its western frontier in the Connecticut River country. Both borders witnessed sporadic fighting until 1755, when full-scale war once more erupted. Included in this volume are a number of the men raised by Governor William Shirley in that year for an abortive assault on the French stronghold at Crown Point.²

During these years of war Massachusetts primarily relied for its defense on its militia force of citizen-soldiers. Universal, compulsory service in the militia for all males between the ages of sixteen and sixty was a virtually unquestioned part of colonial life. Only a relative handful of the population was exempt from service, either through occupational deferment (notably clergymen, public officials, and Harvard College faculty and students) or on grounds of questionable loyalty (blacks and Indians).³ Save for these few exceptions, all Massachusetts men in this period could expect to spend some part of every year either in militia training or perhaps even in actual combat.

The royal governor was the commander-in-chief of all the Massachusetts militia. His military duties included calling out the troops, provisioning them in the field, and erecting and maintaining fortifications. In theory, most of these responsibilities were strictly his own. But in practice the General Court (the colony's legislature) could always he counted upon to keep a close (and often critical) eye on the governor's actions in this area.⁴

Directly below the governor in the military chain of command were commissioned officers, bearing ranks roughly similar to those of their modern counterparts. In the early days of the colony officers had usually received their commissions by election, sometimes by the vote of their own men. The problems with this system of selection had soon become so apparent that it was eventually abandoned. In Massachusetts the governor now possessed the authority to grant or revoke all commissions, though he rarely took such action without first consulting local opinion.⁵

Local sentiment takes on particular importance in a militia force, organized of necessity on the basis of geography. The Massachusetts militia in the eighteenth century consisted of two major organizational components-regiments, usually headed by colonels, and subordinate companies, generally commanded by captains. Militia regiments normally consisted of inhabitants of a single county; companies, the residents of a single town within that county.⁶ Since the military life of the men contained in this volume centered upon the company it will be our primary interest here.

Besides the captain in command, most companies included within their commissioned ranks at least one lieutenant and perhaps an ensign as well. The latter officer had the special responsibility of carrying the company's colors and safeguarding them in battle. The non-commissioned officers of the company, its sergeants and corporals, were appointed directly by the unit commander. Since in the eighteenth century warfare was unthinkable without musical accompaniment, virtually every company had at least one drummer and sometimes a trumpeter. The remainder of the company was made up of simple private soldiers. Strangely enough, there seems to have been no commonly accepted term given to this rank in the eighteenth-century Massachusetts militia. The muster rolls variously describe them as "centinels," "soldiers," or, most rarely, "privates." In most cases no rank at all is given.⁷

Even in colonial times an army managed to generate a sizable amount of paper work. Each company commander was therefore authorized to appoint a clerk to help him keep the company's records in order. The clerk was also responsible for calling the roll and noting any deficiencies in the equipment of the men. All fines levied by the captain for minor infractions were collected by the clerk, who in turn was allowed to retain a stipulated percentage for his own salary. Although the clerk was himself listed on the company's rolls, he was generally considered a noncombatant. But despite all of its apparent advantages, the position was not highly regarded. Companies in this era sometimes numbered as many as one hundred men-too great a burden for many a prospective clerk to willingly accept, particularly when all the men were his friends and neighbors. Company commanders were therefore empowered to fine anyone who refused the post.

It is important to remember, however, that everyone in a militia company-from captain to clerk-was occupying a part-time position. In peacetime a company assembled only a few times a year, either for special ceremonial occasions (e.g., election day), or for regular training days, usually called "musters." During the rest of the year the men of the company followed their various civilian pursuits. During the first decades of the colony, when Indians menaced virtually every community, musters were held as often as once a week. By 1750 most companies were only required to meet three times a year, at times designed to minimize disruptions to the farming cycle. Companies generally mustered once in May and twice in September. The second meeting in September was ordinarily part of a general muster of an entire regiment. Although fines were levied on those who failed to report for training, most militiamen probably welcomed the opportunity to leave farm routine behind for a day. Indeed, by mid-century, training days-particularly the annual regimental muster-had taken on the aspect of community holidays. Large crowds of women, children, and old men were always on hand to cheer the local heroes.⁸

In the eighteenth century military training generally meant many hours of marching and counter-marching and countless repetitions of the manual of arms. Contemporary infantry warfare usually involved two opposing lines of massed troops, each levelling devastating volleys of small-arms fire at the other from extremely close range. This type of warfare required soldiers who were thoroughly trained in all facets of close-order drill and who were disciplined enough to obey orders implicitly, even under intense enemy fire. American commanders consciously strove to mold their companies along these lines, but with only moderate success. The available training time was rarely sufficient.⁹

The nature of the tactics employed was in large part dictated by the limitations of the weapons carried by the troops. The rifle was virtually unknown in Massachusetts at this time, so almost all of its militiamen used some kind of flintlock musket. The musket possessed impressive destructive power but only a very limited range. A well-trained marksman would consider himself fortunate to hit a stationary enemy soldier at fifty or sixty yards. So military tacticians of the day had little reason to place much confidence in the marksmanship of the average soldier. They far preferred to rely on the overwhelming firepower of a massed volley.¹⁰

Every militiaman was required by law to provide his own weapon. If unable to do so, the town would supply him with one-usually on credit. The town was also required to provide its troops with flints and ammunition. Any other piece of equipment a soldier might need was generally his own responsibility. Although some Massachusetts troops in the 1750s were issued blue uniform coats with red facings, most of their comrades trained and went to war in their everyday clothing.¹¹

A part-time military force, haphazardly equipped, was all that Massachusetts required for its defense in the early days. But as the years passed the militia alone was not enough. Men were needed to garrison a growing network of fortifications along the colony's frontiers. And Massachusetts was increasingly called upon to participate in military expeditions beyond its own borders. Such tasks required terms of service longer than most militiamen were willing or able to give.

The colonial government met its new manpower requirements in a variety of ways. If enlistment bonuses did not entice a suitable number of volunteers, the government was perfectly willing to resort to conscription. Whenever the colony contemplated a major expedition, it generally imposed a troop levy on each company or town. The actual selection was left to the discretion of the local officials. Entire militia companies were rarely pressed into this kind of service. The local organization was left intact to fulfill its customary defensive mission and to train additional troops for further levies.¹²

Conscription was also used to secure men for the colony's defensive works, particularly in the early years. But by the middle of the eighteenth century the government apparently preferred to enlist the personnel required for its most important fortifications. And Castle William, which defended the approaches to Boston Harbor, was considered the most important of them all. Since the mission of the great fortress was to defend the capital city, it received lavish attention from the colony's political leaders. The lieutenant governor himself was the ex officio commander of the installation. Special reports on the military readiness of the Castle were sent directly to the General Court. Officers stationed there were required by law to spend carefully specified amounts of time at their duties. Castle William was given a permanent garrison in 1708; in 1743 provision was made to supplement these troops as needed from specially trained militiamen in neighboring towns. Although the Castle was never actually attacked during colonial times, it was certainly well prepared for any eventuality.¹³

The colony's other fortifications saw far more action but received far less attention (and far fewer funds) from the General Court. Military authorities generally preferred to construct forts out of stone; the economy-minded legislature usually insisted on the less expensive wood construction. The typical colonial fort was therefore built of logs reinforced with earth, square or pentagonal in shape, with bastions on each corner. Wood, of course, deteriorates rather rapidly, but the advancing line of settlement tended to make most forts obsolete well before that could become a serious problem.¹⁴

By 1750 the colony was maintaining a number of major fortifications on both its eastern and western frontiers. Fort Dummer (actually just a blockhouse), built in 1723 near Northfield, was for a time the major defense post for all of western Massachusetts. The western defenses were further strengthened during King George's War with the construction of three new forts between the Connecticut River and the New York Border: Fort Pelham at Rowe, Fort Massachusetts at Adams, and Fort Shirley at Heath. Farther north, near what is now Charlestown, New Hampshire, the Massachusetts government built a fourth fort, Fort Number 4. All of these posts played a prominent part in the war. Fort Massachusetts actually fell to the enemy in 1746, but only in spite of heroic resistance offered by Sergeant John Hawks and his tiny command of twenty-two men, three women and five children. They were opposed by 700 French and Indians.¹⁵

A similar network of fortifications defended the colony's eastern frontier. Fort Richmond, the principal defensive post on the Kennebec River, was designed to guard the water route from Quebec. Fort George, with its ten-foot stone walls, stood watch over Brunswick and was partially maintained by the inhabitants of that town. The two other major installations in Maine-Saco Fort and Fort Frederick (originally called Pemaquid)-were both founded in the seventeenth century.¹⁶

Whether on garrison duty or in the field, the life of an eighteenth-century soldier was full of hazards, not all of which could be blamed on the enemy. As in every army, military discipline could be harsh, particularly in wartime. Minor crimes, like insubordination, were usually punished by fines or some form of corporal punishment. The latter might involve lying in irons, flogging, or running the gauntlet. Major crimes, like mutiny, desertion, or sleeping on watch, could result in the death penalty. In practice, however, the death penalty was very rarely meted out, and then only by the very highest levels of the military command under procedures monitored by the General Court.

Of course, the colonial soldier could circumvent all of these punishments merely by obeying orders. Unfortunately, the threat of disease was far less easy to avoid. Poor sanitation and inadequate medical care caused numerous outbreaks of smallpox and dysentery. Although the cause of scurvy was generally well known by mid-century, preventing it from afflicting the colony's troops was quite another matter, given the nature of their normal diet. In the field the soldiers ordinarily subsisted on salt pork and dried peas, supplemented from time to time by such items as corn meal, salt cod, and, very rarely, salt beef. Garrison troops frequently fared somewhat better, for they were usually allowed to grow fruits and vegetables in their own gardens.¹⁷

The soldier too ill or too seriously wounded to continue his duties was ordinarily cared for in a private home at government expense. But the generosity of the colony most definitely did have its limits. Illness was sometimes considered sufficient grounds for discharge, thus leaving the unfortunate soldier solely responsible for all of his medical expenses. If he died on duty his widow was not automatically entitled to a pension, though the government did grant small amounts of money for funeral expenses. The government was less generous to its soldiers held by the enemy. Anyone unlucky enough to fall into the hands of the French did so at his own expense; all wages stopped at that moment.¹⁸

Given the difficult conditions under which they served, the Massachusetts soldiers of the French and Indian wars performed more than adequately when tested in combat. After 1755, however their relative importance to the defense of the Empire declined as greater numbers of British troops arrived on American soil.¹⁹ For it was well known-at least until Concord and Lexington-that Massachusetts men were no match for trained regulars.

Many individuals and institutions have had a hand in making this volume a reality. I should like to thank the Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and, in particular, the Chairman of its Charitable Contributions Committee, Howard Gambrill, Jr., for their continued generosity and support. The New England Historic Genealogical Society, under the direction of Dr. James B. Bell, supplied me with invaluable editorial assistance. Four members of the Society's staff are deserving of special thanks: Dr. Ralph J. Crandall, Anne O. Koopman (Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of the New England Historical and Genealogical Register), William F. Wickham and Kevin D. Bittner. Their diligence and skill made this project possible; their good humor made it endurable.

Robert E. MacKay

Boston, Massachusetts August 1978